It is not often that I write about military philosophy or even specific cases in history; embarking on the road of blogging has never included an actual analysis of both a historical battle situation as well as hypothetical scenarios. Yet this is indeed what I am about to do in this post as I cover a battle in China’s long history of warfare as well as take a look at how one of the scenarios in, of all things, a game, has sparked the idea for this post. In fact, the idea had been sitting around a very long while, but never been brought to fruition simply because…well, you will find out later on in the post.

For now, if you were here for the usual things, you can just skip this post and move on. For those who are interested, I am obviously not even learned at all in the subject of the art of war as 0ne is, but I have been interested in it ever since I was young. Of course, all of this could be taken with a pinch of salt from your point-of-view, which is up to you, the reader, to decide; I am obviously not as learned as 0ne in the subject. I do ask though, if you are going to comment, make sure you know what you are saying first, because I would like anyone who comments to actually understand quite a bit about the subject and not make up stuff that you shoot out through your nose. I have taken quite a bit of effort to run through all of this and I never like taking war as a subject of humor to be taken lightly. This is an early warning to those who do in the comments – I will delete it if I take it as such.

 
Due credits are to be given first. All text from Sun Zi’s Art of War were directly taken from the pictorial 4-volume series, Canfonian Pte. Ltd. which published this series more than ten years ago in 1995; their accuracy may not have been astounding, but their flow of the language is certainly more tasteful. I do check the accuracy of the translation myself where I can; I used to have done so but I lost the entire formatted document which I once wrote up. I also took the history of the Defense of Beijing from the second volume of the same pictorial series. Other acknowledgments will be done throughout the post as I come to them.

And from here on out, we delve first into the historical battle which was entitled “The Defense of Beijing”. This took place during the Ming Dynasty, right after the most infamous military debacle of that period, “The Tragedy of Tumu Fort“, which you can read more about here, as I will not be going into details for that battle. The scenario that I will then take a look at is from the game MechCommander 2, with the apt title “The Defense of Bannikburg”. Though both are obviously not connected at all at first glance other than their titles, I will show you why I would like to put these two together in one post, and how the word “defense” can be used in both an offensive and a defensive way.

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“War is a matter of vital importance to a nation; a matter relating to life and death of the people, survival or ruin of the sovereignty. Hence it demands serious study and under no circumstances can it be neglected.” – Sun Zi (Chapter 1 – Laying Plans, Sun Zi’s Art of War)
 

It is unknown if this is actually a contemporary portrait of Yu Qian, but he was most likely in battle gear instead of scholarly robes during the Defence of Beijing, where he led the Chinese troops to victory after the Tragedy of Tumubao. This image is thanks to Britannica Online.

The Defense of Beijing

“In directing military operations, one should encircle the enemy when one’s military strength is ten times as strong as the enemy’s; attack when one’s army is five times as big as the enemy’s; try to disperse the enemy forces when one has twice as many soldiers as the enemy; be versed in the art of war to defeat the enemy when both sides are equal ins trength; be capable of making retreat when the enemy forces are greater in numbers; avoid a decisive battle with the enemy when on holds less favorable conditions in all respects. A weak army will eventually fall captive to a strong one if it simply holds its ground and conducts a desperate defence.” – Sun Zi (Chapter 3 – Offensive Strategy, Sun Zi’s Art of War)

After the battle of Tumu Fort and the defeat of the 500,000-strong Ming army, the Imperial Court was immeasurably shocked and held an urgent council on whether or not it should fight on, or retreat from the situation. A heated discussion among the ministers ensued – the group led by the tutor of the Imperial Academy advocated retreat to the south, whereas the loyal, brave and upright Yu Qian, who had a thorough knowledge of warfare, resolutely advocated defence of the city.

The Empress Dowager ordered the Prince to take charge of Court affairs, and appointed Yu Qian Secretary of the Military Department whose duty was to defend the capital. Yu then gave a comprehensive analysis of the situation, “In the battle of Tumu Fort we lost 500,000 men. Wala (the Mongolian tribe that had invaded China) also suffered casualties. It must reorganize its army before attacking our strategic positions and Beijing. As long as we act wholeheartedly and make full use of the time to prepare for war, it won’t be difficult to defend our capital.” To stabilize the situation, appease the masses and unify the will of the people, Yu announced Wang Zhen’s (the eunuch that had caused the defeat of the Ming army) crimes and had his lackeys punished.
 

Juyong Pass and Zijing Pass were the routes the Wala army had to pass from the northwest and southwest to attack Beijing. Yu ordered officers Lang Luotong and Sun Xiang to consolidate the defenses separately. Mines and other firearms were laid at strategic points to stop the enemy from entering the city. With the support from the patriotic army officers who advocated war and the solders and people, Yu organized the manpower to solidify the wall and had deep and wide trenches dug beside it. He gathered artisans and technicians in Beijing to manufacture fighting equipment and weapons day and night. Within a few days tens of thousands of suits of armor, 1000 chariots, over 20,000 blunderbusses and 440,000 arrows were manufactured or collected.

Yu then ordered that provisions (measuring a few million shi; 1 shi = 1 hectoliter) in the godowns in prefectures and counties nearby be moved to the capital city. At this time, the number of soldiers who were left in the capital did not exceed 100,000 and most of them were old and weak. Yu ordered an official named Shi Heng and some army officers to have them reorganized. After one month’s reorganization, consolidation, drills and training, the number of soldiers who were fit for combat stood at 220,000, and all of them were provided with weapons and suits of armor.
 

In the 10th month of the same year, Wala’s main force, under the command of Yexian and guided by eunuch Xining, who had been taken prisoner, crossed the mountain stealthily, detoured to South Pass and captured Zijing Pass. Sun Xiang was killed in battle. The Wala army then pressed on to Beijing.

Yu assigned his subordinates to take their troops out and arrange them in formations outside of the 9 gates of Beijing. He himself stationed a troop at Desheng Gate, a strategic position. Having made these arrangements, he ordered that all the gates of the city be closed, signifying his resolution that he would not return to the city if the enemy was not defeated.
 

Yexian led his troops straight to the wall of Beijing and deployed them outside Xizhi Gate. Yu dispatched officers Gao Li and Mao Fushu to take on the enemy with a troop of soldiers. They defeated Wala’s vanguard north of Tucheng at Zhangyi Gate, killing a few hundred men. The victory scored in the first battle boosted the morale of the Ming soldiers. That very night Yu ordered his men to launch a surprise attack on the enemy camp, from where they rescued over 1000 people abducted by Wala.

Having failed in their first encounter, the Wala troops turned to attack the Desheng Gate. It happened that there was a heavy downpour that day. According to Yu’s orders, Shi Heng led a troop of elite soldiers to the residential area in the suburb where an ambush was laid. He then assigned a small number of cavalrymen to resist the enemy. They pretended to lose the fight so as to lure the enemy to the ambush position.

Over 10,000 Wala cavalrymen charged towards the wall. Yu ordered his men to beat the drums. On hearing this, the ambushers rushed out to fight the invaders. At the same time, cannons were used to fire at them. Facing a pincer attack, the Wala cavalry suffered a major defeat. Yexian’s younger brother, Boluo, and others died in the gunfire and many Wala soldiers were killed or wounded.
 

Having been defeated in 2 encounters, Yexian tried to attack Xizhi Gate. As it was heavily guarded and the Ming soldiers were harboring a bitter hatred for the enemy, the Wala troops failed in their mission and lost many men. On the 14th day of the 10th month Yexian launched an attack against Zhangyi Gate. Yu ordered vice-commander Wu Xing and Captain Wang Jing and other officers to arrange the blunderbuss group in front and the arrow-and-knife group in the rear. The 2 groups coordinated with each other closely and dealt a heavy blow to Yexian’s main force.

Another 50,000-strong Wala cavalry launched an attack on Juyong Pass. General Luo Tong, who was in charge of the defense of the pass, made use of the sudden change of weather. He ordered his men to pour ice-cold water ont he wall, making the pass an “iced fortress”. The Wala troops were unable to attack it. Taking the enemy unawares, Luo’s troops dashed out of the wall suddenly and attacked them, shattering Wala’s attempt to capture Juyong Pass.

The battle for the defense of Beijing lasted 5 days. Yexian was afraid he might land himself in a dilemma, so he struck camp and fled in the night. Military Director Yu Qian had scored a resounding victory in the battle for the defense of Beijing.
 

A picture of the gate tower of Desheng Gate, provided by Wiki’s article (link above).

Analysis of the Defense of Beijing

“Accordingly, a wise commander puts himself into a position that makes defeat impossible and does not miss any opportunity to defeat the enemy. Thus, a triumphant army will not fight with the enemy until the conditions for victory are created, while an army destined for defeat will always fight with its opponent first, in the hope that it may win by sheer good luck.” – Sun Zi (Chapter 4 – Tactical Dispositions, Sun Zi’s Art of War)

First of all, we must bear in mind that the battle for the defense of Beijing took place at a time when the Ming Dynasty was somewhat falling apart, though the Chinese already had knowledge and use of the blunderbuss, as well as other firearms. Secondly, the Ming Dynasty had been dealt a great blow beforehand, losing half a million men just like that in the fall of Tumu Fort, along with its emperor, the leader of the Chinese people in those times.

With the loss of the Emperor, the Empress Dowager was thus in charge of the court, and it was a wise decision for her to put her faith in Yu Qian. Yu Qian himself was an outstanding commander – other than just knowing who to put in charge, he also knew how the battle situation would likely unfold, and estimated that he had enough time to gather materials and resources to train up an army that was sufficient to defend Beijing. In most cases, less able officers might not have been able to guess that the Wala army would have to reorganize, and would have advocated fleeing the doubtlessly swiftly advancing army of the Wala tribe.
 

Further, Yu took steps to ensure that he had enough food and materials. Other than the consolidation of the provisions from the nearby counties and prefectures, he also ordered the technicians and manufacturers in Beijing to make, in just a few days, enough battle equipment to keep his army well outfitted. Reorganization of the soldiers in Beijing itself was also a priority – dismissal of the older and/or unfit soldiers, enlisting new recruits and training the army, all of these ensured that the army he had just created would be able to fend off the Wala army.

This demonstrates an important point in the art of war – never forget your basics. War is not just a battle of wits and strength, but also fully a battle of resources and materials. They who do not understand this fact will suffer if going to war unprepared. Drills and training may increase and enhance the combat strength of an army, but without food, can an army fight on? Without sufficient funds, can you provide for an entire army, and repair damaged equipment?
 

With the basics out of the way, when the Wala army pressed its advantage, Yu placed his armies in strategic positions and commanded the overall battle himself. His tough resolution to only re-enter the city after he had defeated the enemy by closing all the gates would have sealed his determination and showed his men that the supreme commander was more than willing to engage the enemy alongside them in a fight to the death.

During the battle for the defense of Beijing, Yu and his subordinate officers took appropriate steps and adopted flexible strategies in order to stump the Wala army and keep the initiative in their own hands. Even though the Wala army was the offensive party, they were kept on tenterhooks and repeatedly suffered surprise attacks or were thwarted in their attempts to take the defense out. Fine examples of the good use of men and equipment and sudden changes in a battle situation were the combination of the blunderbuss and arrow-and-knife groups, while Luo Tong made use of the snowy weather change to prevent the Wala army from attacking Juyong Pass.
 

I can hardly doubt that, without the good command of Yu Qian and his subordinate officers, ample preparations, flexible tactics and more, the defense of Beijing might as well not have happened. It was because of these factors that made it possible for Yu to fend off the Wala attack and force Yexian to retreat after just 5 days of offense.

Is it therefore wise to say that defense is then easier than offense? I would say not. There are situations in combat that favor the offense, and situations that favor the defense. One place can be easily defended with a small army, whereas another can be easily attacked by a small army instead. It is difficult to predetermine if offense is easier than defense without knowledge of the terrain, the enemy’s troops and your own army. Further, there are many other factors and aspects to be taken into account, and one cannot say for sure which might be easier than the other without first studying the situation carefully and thoroughly.
 

In general then, is defense easier than offense? It might seem that way with the defense of Beijing – in terms of initiative, Yexian certainly had none of it this time round, whereas Yu knew the terrain well, and waited at ease for an incoming enemy. But again, I would say it is hard to tell exactly, and that initiative can just as easily be given to either the offensive or defensive party. It just depends on who has done more homework, so to speak, and is willing to go to the correct lengths to impose his will on the enemy so as to manipulate the enemy and not be manipulated in turn.

With that then, we turn to a scenario that can easily incorporate both the aspects of an offensive and a defensive party in two different variations, demonstrated by a mission in MechCommander 2 known as the “Defense of Bannikburg”.

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